


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March 15, 1966

Col. William E. Odom
DCS/I, USAFE
APO, New York 09633

Dear Bill,

I want to thank you personally for your kindness to Mr. Tidwell and myself during our recent visit. I have already dropped a note to General Holloway about it. We had a very interesting and informative series of visits. As you know, I have been on many overseas visits, but this one was by all odds the best.

I have been thinking about your new Intelligence Research Center and, as a result, have posed to myself some interesting questions about how the whole system should work in a perfect world, how it must work in the current environment, and how does one actually make it work better. In the first place, I start with the fact that a considerable amount and wide variety of all source data is available to you. This includes not only the information you collect with your own resources, but that from all Air Force and from other national and third party efforts. In addition, you or your command has a definite and more or less clearly specified geographical area of interest about which considerably more detail must be accrued for your internal interests than is necessary for higher echelons to receive. At the same time, you must furnish summary or "big picture" information to those higher echelons. The first direct question is: Should the information which you forward be integrated by you or sent piecemeal for their integration? (It is, of course, obvious that you must possess an internal integration capability

to meet your unique detailed needs so only the scope of your integration efforts is under discussion, not its existence.)

The second basic question relates to the tasking of collection efforts. Here the problem is to optimize such tasking so the needs of your Command are met while, at the same time, the national needs are considered. This is somewhat complicated by the fact that collection sources are not generally completely understood. Strengths and limitations tend to be obscured by remoteness, both in a bureaucratic and security sense. This well may lead to an over-dependence on one's own resources which are known instead of tasking the resources of others which are not so well known, and, in fact which may have credibility problems. Another facet of tasking has to do with the answers to the first basic problem, if you integrate all source data prior to forwarding to higher echelons, your needs may be quite different, and probably larger, than if you only integrate for your own internal consumption.

As I see it, the IRC is a step toward creating a viable integration capability. I believe it to be a very good and large step. However, the end goal might be more clearly defined. Does this goal include, at some appropriate level, either within EUCOM or USAFE, integration of all Photo and SIGINT? Can this integration be performed optimumally by a staff organization as opposed to the IRC type integration of different source photography? Should other (non-Photo and non-SIGINT) data be integrated at your level? If so, does not this integration require a full-time organizational unit with this assigned mission, just as IRC has a specific assigned mission? Should the integration capability be oriented outwardly as well as internally? And, finally, should not the same organization charged with the integration for your internal use also be charged with, or at least have a large vote in, the tasking of all collection sources?

One alternative is to visualize a jointly manned organizational element responsive to EUCOM with executive authority delegated

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to USAFE (like EEIC), located at Weisbaden, whose mission would be to integrate all Photo, SIGINT, and other source information for the production of the required, unique, finished intelligence for the use of EUCOM, USAFE, USAEUR, []

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[] In addition to target information which would also contain penetration factors, there would be detailed OB information required for the specifics of all assigned contingency planning (such as evacuation, logistical support, demolition, etc.). Of course, the intimate knowledge of required inputs would exist in this organization and, hence, it could serve as a central point for tasking and collection requirements. Another major responsibility could be that of setting up and maintaining an operational and frequently tested capability to furnish targets and associated information in the extremely short time periods characteristic of continuing combat of a limited, conventional nature over periods of the order of many days. Thus, for a European or Middle East "Viet Nam," at least Intelligence would possess the reaction time necessary and through this might make it possible for operational planners to also attain the required reaction time. The important elements of this alternative are, first, the true integration of all source information and, second, a reaction time appropriate to a wide variety of situations wherein all source information could be used. I do not believe that these objectives can be feasibly attained through normal staff organizations not involving direct authority and use of highly skilled technicians and specialists in data handling.

I realize that the foregoing is likely difficult to achieve. And there may be other alternatives which could satisfy the objectives. Furthermore, a cursory two-day visit hardly qualifies me as a real expert. Yet the problems are real and an organized approach to their solutions is likely to be useful. I believe a useful procedure might include:

- a. A clear statement of the goals, including definitions and agreements suitable to the Commands involved.

b. An assembly of the alternative possible ways to work toward these goals, including the cost and likely payoffs of each.

c. Based on b., a selection of the best course of action with specific time phased steps spelled out together with the growth in capability associated with each step.

To follow the above procedure, a joint task force organized at the EUCOM level (or at least concurred in by them) might be a useful mechanism. If you plan on being in Washington soon, I would be glad to talk further about it. I really believe that you have a unique opportunity to take the lead in attacking problems that apply in many other areas besides your own, and, at the same time, to make a large contribution to our interest and posture in the European area. The existence of friendly and capable J-2's of EUCOM and of USAEUR appears to me to create a very benign environment for the solution to joint intelligence problems.

Sincerely,

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Bud,

Is it o.k. with you if I send this? I have known Col. Odom a long time and would like to help him. USAFE is forming what they call an Intelligence Research Center designed to combine in one place TKH and non-TKH photography. Their objective is to strive for better utilization of input information.

I have checked this with [redacted] and he concurs that it might be helpful to USAFE.

*Verbal OK from
Bud 17 Mar 1966.*

17 March 1966
(DATE)

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1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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